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CONTRACTS - VENDOR'S °AGREEMENT NOT TO COMPETE - CONSTRUCTION OF THE AREEMENT - Defendant sold his hospital located in Floyd
county to plaintiffs for $40,000. As part of the consideration defendant agreed
not to build another hospital in Floyd county for ten years. A year later
defendant went over into the adjoining county of Knott and built a hospital
about 300 yards from the Floyd county line, naming it the "Stumbo Memorial
Hospital." The evidence showed that 828 o~t _of its 1008 patients came from
Floyd County. Plaintiffs sue to enjoin breach of the restrictive covenant.
-Held, that an injunction should be granted restraining defendant from receiv-
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ing for medical care any person who lives or resides in Floyd county on the
theory that defendant was violating the spirit of the agreement not to compete.
Johnson v. Stumbo, 277 Ky. 301, 126 S. W. (2d) 165 (1939).
It is frequently said that a contract in restraint of trade must be strictly
construed so that the area of the restraint will be as narrow as possible.1 This
point of view has undoubtedly resulted from the fact that such agreements
have always been looked upon with disfavor by the common law, which has
taken the position that the one claiming the benefit of the covenant has the
burden of justifying his claim. However, this principle has not been carried to
its logical conclusion when the case is one in which the promisor has sought
to evade his undertaking by accomplishing indirectly what his covenant forbade
his doing directly. In this type of case the courts have been inclined to hold
that the promisor has agreed to refrain from conduct which, while it may
be contrary to the spirit and meaning of the promise, frequently is clearly
not within the letter. Thus it has been held that it is a violation of a covenant
not to engage in a competing business for the promisor to become an employee
of a competitor in the prohibited territory; 2 or for the promisor to establish
a business in the name of a member of his family, he himself being active in
its conduct. 3 The same result is reached where the vendor-promisor forms a
corporation and becomes a stockholder,4 or finances another in the same line
and encourages patronage of that business. 6 While the court in the principal
case was thus justified by the decided cases 6 in its desire to protect the vendee
in his purchase of goodwill, it faced a most difficult question of what sort of
relief it could give because of the special circumstances involved. A practical
problem arose as to how to allow Dr. Stumbo to run the hospital in Knott
county, a thing which he clearly had a right to do in view of the terms of the
contract, but keep him from drawing patients from Floyd county, the area in
which he had sold the goodwill. The court could enjoin solicitation in Floyd
county, but in this particular case solication was unnecessary to attract patients.
The name of the hospital "The Stumbo Memorial Hospital" was enough to
accomplish the desired result. The court chose the only way open to accomplish the result by granting an injunction requiring Dr. Stumbo not to accept
1

Wiggins Ferry Co. v. Ohio & Mississippi Ry., 72 Ill. 360 (1874). See generally 24 AM. & ENG. ENcYc. LAW 857 (1903); 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcTS, rev. ed.,
§ 1636 (1937).
2
Fleischman v. Rahmstorf, (C. C. A. 9th, 1915) 226 F. 443; Ammon v.
Keill, 95 Neb. 695, 146 N. W. 1009 (1914); Smith v. Webb, 176 Ala. 596,
58 So. 913, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) II91 (1912). See collection of cases, 93 A. L. R.
121 (1934).
8
Akers v. Rappe, 30 Cal. App. 290, 158 P. 129 (1916); Fleckenstein Bros.
Co. v. Fleckenstein, 66 N. J. Eq. 252, 57 A. 1025 (1904).
4
Moore & Handley Hdw. Co. v. Towers Hdw. Co., 87 Ala. 206, 6 So. 41
(1888); General Bronze Corp. v. Schmeling, 213 Wis. 150, 250 N. W. 412 (1933).
5
C. H. Barrett Co. v. Ainsworth, 156 Mich. 351, 120 N. W. 797 (1909);
cf. Smith v. Hancock, [1894] 2 Ch. 377.
6
The court had two very similar cases in Kentucky as precedents: Elkins v.
Barclay, 243 Ky. 144, 47 S. W. (2d) 945 (1932); Skaggs v. Simpson, 33 Ky. L.
Rep. 410, 110 S. W. 251 (1908).
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patients if they were from Floyd county. The court's decision may be questionable, since it is arguable that it infringes upon the liberty of the people in
Floyd county to go where they please to receive medical aid. It is in effect
placing a restriction upon persons who were not parties to the contract.
Whether the court was justified in imposing this restriction upon their personal liberties depends on a balancing of the interests involved. On the one hand
is the interest of protecting a vendee in the enjoyment of the goodwill he has
purchased. On the other hand is the interest of the peopl~ of Floyd county in
being free to go where they desire in securing medical aid.

